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LONG LIVE THE BILL OF RIGHTS! LONG LIVE AKHIL
REED AMAR'S THE BILL OF RIGHTS!
Lackland H. Bloom, Jr.*
Akhil Reed Amar's volume, The Bill of Rights: Creation and
Reconstruction ("The Bill of Rights"),' deserves to sit on every
constitutional scholar and lawyer's shelf along with such other
contemporary classics as Alexander Bickers The Least Danger-
ous Branch,2 Charles Black's Structure and Relationship in
Constitutional Law,3 John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust,
4
and Philip Bobbitt's Constitutional Fate.5 This book builds on
two of the most breathtaking and important law review articles
of the past decade-Professor Amar's The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, and The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.6 Professor Amar's contributions to constitutional scholar-
ship are of the first order. The Bill of Rights is the centerpiece
of that contribution but it is scarcely its limit. I will focus, very
briefly, on the following four aspects of The Bill of Rights which
I believe help to explain its significance: (1) its place as the
cornerstone of a large and seemingly well-integrated scholarly
agenda; (2) its analytic methodology; (3) its explanatory power;
and (4) its rhetorical elegance.
An Integrated Project. A standard but frequently all too true
criticism of law professors is that we often fail to have a co-
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herent research agenda.7 We tend to be eclectic, producing a
piece on this and a piece on that with little apparent connec-
tion. One cannot credibly level this charge against Professor
Amar. Rather, he has quite clearly embarked on the project of
methodically confronting and working through the foundational
issues of constitutional law in a logical and interconnected
manner while bringing to bear a unique perspective and offer-
ing up new insights.
All of Professor Amar's major works, as well as most of his
shorter pieces, build on that which has preceded and anticipate
that which is yet to come. To date, The Bill of Rights is truly
the planet with the greatest gravitational pull in Professor
Amar's universe; but it is closely connected to his other impor-
tant works, like Of Sovereignty and Federalism,8 The Consent
of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V,9
The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles,1 ° as
well as the most recent Intratextualism."
The Bill of Rights is, by itself, a massive and impressive un-
dertaking. It is all the more impressive, however, when seen as
just a part, though a central part, of a much broader project.
Possibly the most central tenet of Professor Amar's scholarship
is a belief that things do tend to fit together, at least in our
Constitution, our constitutional history, and perhaps even more
remarkably, our constitutional law as well. He attempts to
present an account of a relatively holistic conception of the
Constitution through an ever expanding integrated body of
scholarship. Heavily emphasizing the significance of popular
sovereignty, Professor Amar attempts to demonstrate the inter-
connectedness of different provisions of the text, originalist pur-
pose at different significant times, important constitutional
paradigm cases, other influential texts, including state constitu-
tions and both renowned and obscure constitutional precedent.
He has executed this herculean task with energy, brilliance and
7. This criticism is one to which I must myself plead guilty.
8. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987).
9. Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 457 (1994).
10. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES (1997).
11. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747 (1999).
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discipline. As impressive as such a project may be, the mere,
though admittedly rare, ability to produce it does not validate
its claims.' Ultimately, one must judge the value of the pro-
ject on its substantive merits rather than on the ambition of its
scope. Still, the ability to perceive and explain so much of this
disorderly area with a relatively coherent vision is the mark of
quite an extraordinary mind at work.
Methodology. A holistic approach to constitutional law will
often fail because no single theory, perspective or methodology
is sufficient to explain this rich, complicated, and indeed messy
area of law. Most "grand theories" run aground as they attempt
to force us to relinquish too much that is settled, too much that
seems correct, however awkward it may be to explain. I do not
believe that Professor Amar's work suffers from this difficulty.
It consciously attempts to expand our horizons rather than
contract them. Instead of championing a specific constitutional
methodology, Professor Amar capably employs virtually all ac-
cepted forms of constitutional analysis. As such, despite the
frequent novelty of his insights, he generally derives them with
the conventional tools of our trade.
Perhaps no working constitutional scholar employs textual
analysis more carefully and skillfully than Professor Amar. This
book is, in a sense, a 300-page case study of textual analysis
performed at the highest level of professionalism; however, his
careful reading of the First Amendment, 3 the Second Amend-
ment,'4 and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 5 stand
out in particular. Yet Professor Amar does not simply do textu-
al analysis well. He has made extraordinary contributions to
textual methodology. Throughout this volume and, more expan-
sively, in a recent article in the Harvard Law Review," Profes-
sor Amar employs and explains the importance of intratext-
ualism-the practice of drawing conclusions from similar or dis-
12. Recently, Judge Richard A. Posner has taken aim at the pursuit of grand
theory in constitutional law and elsewhere and Professor Amar has been, at least, a
minor target. See Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1 (1998); Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 1637, 1638 (1998).
13. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 20-45.
14. See id. at 51-59.
15. See id. at 163-74.
16. Amar, supra note 11.
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similar phrasing in separate constitutional provisions. Of
course, Professor Amar did not invent intratextual analysis. As
he well illustrates, Justices Marshall and Story all but perfect-
ed this technique during the Founding generation. 7 Professor
Amar has brought intratextualism to our attention, however,
and he has examined and deployed it in much the same way
that Professor Charles Black did with structural argument.'8
The intratextual analysis that Professor Amar uses in compar-
ing the wording of the First Amendment and the Necessary and
Proper Clause, 9 the Preamble and the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments," and the Second Amendment and Article I,
paragraph 1621 is truly illuminating and is among the most in-
tellectually satisfying aspects of this book.
Much of Professor Amar's book involves detailed consider-
ation of originalist materials. Professor Amar builds his case
plausibly and understandably. I am not a constitutional his-
torian, but rather a user of the products of constitutional histo-
rians. Thus, I will leave the critique of Professor Amar's histori-
cal analysis to others. I do note, however, that the historical
narrative is measurably enriched by Professor Amar's conscious
attempts to study and explain constitutional history, not simply
from the perspective of the Framers and ratifiers, but to encom-
pass as well the contributions of significant additional actors in
our constitutional drama such as Peter Zenger, James Callend-
er, Samuel Hoar, Harriet Beecher Stowe, and Frederick Doug-
las.22 Likewise, Professor Amar builds his textual and histori-
cal case with a persuasive comparison of the resolution of con-
stitutional issues involving the territories alongside of the
states' and by developing how state constitutions influenced
the drafting of the Bill of Rights, which in turn influenced the
drafting of later state constitutions.24
17. See id. at 749-66.
18. See generally CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (1969).
19. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 36-39.
20. See id. at 120-25.
21. See id. at 51-52.
22. See id. at 84-85, 236-37, 261-62.
23. See id. at 156-58, 167-69, 247-51, 277-78.
24. See id. at 28-29, 32-33, 60-61, 64-65, 67, 83.
316 [Vol. 33:313
LONG LIVE THE BILL OF RIGHTS!
Professor Amar is also a master analyst of precedent. Al-
though doctrinal analysis does not play as large a role in The
Bill of Rights as in some of Professor Amar's other work, a
close reading of constitutional classics such as the Slaughter-
House Cases' or Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore26 delivers
fresh insight. He is equally adept at illuminating issues with
precedent that is scarcely part of the constitutional canon, such
as Campbell v. State"7 or Livingston v MooreY
Professor Amar also uses structural analysis expertly. Indeed
he makes a major contribution to structural analysis by extend-
ing it beyond the formal governmental institutions created by
the Constitution such as the Congress, the President, and the
states to the People as the repository of national sovereignty.
As such, structural methodology becomes one of Professor
Amar's strongest arguments, especially in support of his read-
ing of the Second Amendment and the Jury Clauses.29
Professor Amar has written a book which certainly has the
potential to be influential long into the future because it em-
ploys, builds on, and enriches the conventional devices of consti-
tutional analysis, rather than attempting to restrict them, re-
fine them to the point that they may only be utilized by a high-
ly skilled elite, or throwing them overboard for the technique of
the moment.
Explanatory Power. The most significant distinguishing fea-
ture of The Bill of Rights is its explanatory power. This is not
a book that attempts to set our world on its head. Quite the
contrary. Although his insights are often unique, Professor
Amar's explicit goal in The Bill of Rights is to explain how we
have arrived at where we are and why, ° for the most part, we
should be here. More often than not, I believe that he succeeds.3'
25. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); see AMAIR, supra note 1, at 210-13, 226-27.
26. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); see AMAR, supra note 1, at 128-29, 140-46, 164-66.
27. 11 Ga. 353 (1852); see AMAR, supra note 1, at 154-55, 165, 169.
28. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469 (1833); see AMAR, supra note 1, at 182-83.
29. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 46-50, 83-88, 98-104, 129-33.
30. See id. at 307.
31. On occasion, I find some of Professor Amar's claims a bit too creative to be
persuasive. I tend to agree with the substance of Professor Tribe's criticism of Profes-
sor Amar's articles on constitutional amendment outside of Article V and presidential
immunity from suit. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:
Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV.
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I will focus briefly on what I consider to be three of the most
significant contributions of the book. The first is the explana-
tion and justification for the exalted status of the Bill of Rights
in our legal and political culture. Conventional wisdom credits
Madison and the 1787-1791 generation with the creation of this
edifice. Certainly, they gave it birth. But even conventional
wisdom notes the embarrassing incompleteness of the initial
Bill of Rights, both in its inapplicability to the states, as well
as its toleration of slavery and unconcern with many other
significant aspects of equality and liberty. Still, we have tended
to perceive the 1791 Bill of Rights as a great start-as a char-
ter of individual liberty subsequently expanded and improved
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Professor Amar argues, on the
basis of text, history, precedent and structure, that the Bill of
Rights was initially conceived as a combination of structural
and individual rights protection with heavy emphasis on struc-
ture." Consequently, the Bill of Rights was not utilized signifi-
cantly to protect individual rights prior to the Fourteenth
Amendment (which is understood by conventional accounts).
Furthermore, it was not widely revered as a charter of liberty,
nor even generally considered a "Bill of Rights" prior to adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment had as much to do with our current
conception of and reverence for the Bill of Rights (and not sim-
ply its incorporation) as the Framers of 1787-1791.
There are a number of reasons why the pre-Civil War concep-
tion of the Bill of Rights might be quite different from our own.
The Supreme Court's jurisdiction was quite limited. An aggres-
sively individualistic conception of the Bill of Rights could not
coexist with the institution of slavery, even assuming that
slaves would not be considered rights holders given that the
suppression of the rights of abolitionists was also crucial to the
1221, 1240-41, 1246-48 (1995). With a few minor exceptions, however, such as the
notion that the Fifteenth Amendment should be understood to ensure the right to
vote on juries, see AMAR, supra note 1, at 272-74, I find The Bill of Rights to be sig-
nificantly less eccentric than the analysis and claims of the articles discussed by Pro-
fessor Tribe. That is hardly to suggest that I endorse all of the analysis in this book,
but rather, that I consider most claims to be well within the bounds of reasonable
disagreement.
32. See generally AmAR, supra note 1, at 1-133.
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continued existence of slavery.' The explanation that Professor
Amar highlights so effectively in this book is the underlying
difference in the nature of the perceived threats against which
the Bill of Rights was intended to protect prior to and after the
Civil War.
Before the Civil War, the primary concern was self-dealing
and unresponsiveness by an elite centralized government; a
problem of tyranny of the minority, or "agency costs" as Profes-
sor Amar puts it.' After the Civil War, the primary threat
was the reverse: the more familiar majority oppression of the
minority." This is hardly a revelation; but part of the genius
of Professor Amar's book is how well it reminds us of what we
have forgotten, or at least what we have de-emphasized. We
have tended to think of the Bill of Rights as a full-blown,
though still incomplete, charter of liberties as of 1791, though
we should have been aware that this was not really so. Pro-
fessor Amar documents how clearly this was not the case, forc-
ing us to reconceptualize the origin of the Bill of Rights, there-
by crediting the 1868 generation not simply with expanding the
application of the Bill of Rights, but for reconstructing it (as
well as the nation). If the book accomplished no more than this,
it would be a serious contribution indeed.
Professor Amar also offers the most plausible explanation of
incorporation of the Bill of Rights to the states that I have yet
encountered. For twenty years, I have taught the Black, 6
Brennan,7 and Frankfurter' approaches to incorporation and
have found none of them wholly satisfactory. Justice Black's
total incorporation seems obtusely mechanical and inadequate
to explain what the Court actually has done. Justice Brennan's
selective incorporation seems manipulative and ungrounded in
text or history. Justice Frankfurter's fundamental fairness ap-
proach seems better able to explain judicial practice and pres-
ents a plausible theoretical explanation as well but still re-
mains distressingly ad hoc.
33. See id. at 160-62, 269-72, 278-79.
34. See id. at xiii.
35. See id. at 288-94.
36. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 120 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
37. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
38. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Professor Amar builds a textual and structural case for his
refined incorporation approach, which distinguishes individual
protection guarantees from structural provisions. 9 He presents
a plausible originalist defense.40 Obviously, his exposition will
not end originalist arguments on this subject. As with the
Rosenbergs and the Kennedy assassination, historical debate
over the incorporation of the Bill of Rights seems destined to
continue indefinitely. Refined incorporation is largely consistent
with existing incorporation. Its acceptance would not require
rejection of any prior decisions to incorporate, though if taken
seriously, it would require extension to previously unincorporat-
ed provisions.4 I certainly do not expect the Court to adopt
Professor Amar's refined incorporation approach. The incorpora-
tion battle has been fought and won with other weapons. For
students of the Constitution, however, it provides a better justi-
fication of this essential component of our constitutionalism.
The most important theme in all of Professor Amar's work,
including The Bill of Rights, is popular sovereignty. A reader of
Professor Amar's work must conclude that if one project is dear
to his heart, it is to put "the People" back into our constitution-
al discourse. In The Bill of Rights and elsewhere, Professor
Amar argues that we have misunderstood both the Founding
and the Reconstruction Eras by failing to appreciate the signifi-
cance that these respective framing generations placed in "the
People" and by mistaking it for a faith in or commitment to one
level of government or another. This is a truly significant redis-
covery. As Professor Amar shows throughout the book, but
especially with respect to the Second Amendment and the jury,
consideration of the importance of the People as a constitutional
entity, indeed as an institution, refocuses analysis and often
provides a credible explanation for matters which otherwise
seem confused and obscure. Professor Amar's explication of how
the jury implements and has protected popular sovereignty in a
39. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 215-30.
40. See id. at 225-30.
41. As I understand it, refined incorporation would lead to the incorporation of
the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, the Third Amendment prohibi-
tion against quartering of troops, the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by grand
jury, and the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury in a civil case. See id. at
257-77. I must confess that I find the discussion of the extent to which jury rights
ought to be incorporated a bit ambiguous.
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real and significant way largely explains the emphasis in the
Bill of Rights on an institution which to many modernists
seems archaic and troublesome.42 Likewise, a focus on popular
sovereignty largely explains why our "embarrassing Second
Amendment"' was anything but embarrassing to the 1787
generation who understood the role of arms in protecting "the
People" against arbitrary centralized government, and to the
1868 generation who understood the role of arms in protecting
"the People" against private violence aided by an unresponsive
state." Recognition of the central role of the sovereignty of the
People often changes the entire nature of the constitutional con-
versation. Professor Amar builds an overwhelming case for the
significance of "the People" in constitutional law. This is a con-
tribution of the first order of magnitude.
The Rhetoric. I have read classics such as The Least Danger-
ous Branch45 and Democracy and Distrust" several times dur-
ing my career. I would return to these books if for no other
reason than intellectual enlightenment-the joy of discovering
new insights in familiar territory. But I return to them as well
because they are simply a joy to read. The Bill of Rights is a
book that I will return to many times for the same reason. This
is a beautifully written book, especially given that its subject is
often quite technical. It is a book that I believe can be appreci-
ated by scholar and layman alike. Let me provide just two ex-
amples.
Focusing on why application of the Bill of Rights to the
States may have seemed quite different to the generation of
1787 than the generation of 1868, Professor Amar explains:
As white, male, propertied Virginians, Madison, Jefferson
and Henry belonged to an ongoing republic that had been
practicing self-government for 150 years before the Consti-
tution came along. Thus the Virginia House of Burgesses
was already older for them than the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is for us today. In a deep sense, the Virginia Declara-
42. See id. at 23-24, 70-75, 83-93, 242-44, 269-75.
43. See generally Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99
YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
44. See A&LA, supra note 1, at 47-49, 216-18, 262-63.
45. BICKEL, supra note 2.
46. ELY, supra note 4.
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tion of Rights was for them prior to the federal Bill of
Rights. Chronologically and perhaps emotionally, Virginia
came first, before the Union. But not for Bingham, or for an
entire generation of later Americans growing up in places
like Ohio. Before Ohio was even a state, it was a federal
territory, governed by the federal Constitution and the
Union's Northwest Ordinance. For Bingham, these docu-
ments came first, framing the state and constraining its
lawful power.47
In this short elegant paragraph, Professor Amar describes a
basis for a difference of mindset that helps explain an extraor-
dinary transformation of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights.
Describing the transformation of vision between 1787 and
1868, Professor Amar writes:
Over and over, the 1789 Bill proclaimed "the right[s]" and
"the powers" of "the people"--phrases conjuring up civic re-
publicanism, collective political action, public rights, and
positive liberty. The complementary phrase in the 1866
amendment-"privileges or immunities of citizensr-indi-
cates a subtle but real shift of emphasis, reflecting a vision
more liberal than republican, more individualistic than
collectivist, more private than public, more negative than
positive.4"
Here, in a short but rich paragraph, two-thirds of the way
through the book, Professor Amar employs textual analysis to
epigrammatically capture much of the argument that has pre-
ceded in a manner that rings so true to the reader.
I could go on with countless other examples. If you have not
read the book, the prospect of enjoying many more such passag-
es should be reason enough to buy or even borrow a copy. If
you have read the book, you will doubtlessly recall several such
favorite examples of your own.
Will this book come to be regarded as a classic? I hope so. I
hope that I have explained why it deserves to be. I have no
doubt that it will be so regarded by serious constitutional histo-
47. AMAR, supra note 1, at 158.
48. Id. at 215-16 (alteration in original).
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rians and scholars. I do not know whether it will become a part
of the canon to a somewhat wider audience. In an admittedly
unscientific journey through the legal and historical sections of
two of the leading chain book stores recently, I was disheart-
ened to find that Amar's The Bill of Rights was not to be found
in the company of Bickel, Bork, Epstein, Dworkin, Posner, or
Ely (though perhaps all copies had been sold).
Happily, Amar's The Constitution and Criminal Procedure:
First Principles49 was indeed represented. I attribute this to
nothing more than the fact that all but The Bill of Rights are
available in paperback. I do not doubt that this deficiency will
soon enough be remedied. This is a book that could and should
be appreciated and enjoyed by an audience substantially broad-
er than the scholarly community.
As I noted above, this book is rather clearly part of a much
larger emerging but obviously uncompleted design. Considering
that Professor Amar is still a young scholar, and given his
astounding productivity, it will be fascinating to see how he
will build upon and perhaps even transform The Bill of Rights
as he extends its lessons to other contexts. In a brilliant and
provocative volume, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure:
First Principles," Professor Amar has already engaged in far
more detailed analysis of many of the criminal procedure guar-
antees. I can imagine a similar, more detailed future treatment
of the First Amendment, Second Amendment, Eighth
Amendment and what .Professor Amar has referred to as the
"diaspora of rights-those scattered provisions before and after
the Bill of Rights that could be viewed as a companion Bill of
Rights in exile."5' The Bill of Rights is a bold and enlightening
foundation for a scholarly enterprise that will hopefully contin-
ue to expand and to enrich us for generations to come.
49. AMAR, supra note 10.
50. Id.
51. AMAR, supra note 1, at 298.
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